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At their latest annual summit in Vietnam in November 2006, 
the leaders of the 21 members of the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation  (APEC)  forum  launched  a  process  that  could 
ultimately produce the largest single act of trade liberalization 
in history. They agreed to “seriously consider” negotiating a Free 
Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) and instructed their 
officials to “undertake further studies on ways and means to 
promote” the initiative so that they could address it at their next 
summit in Australia in September 2007.
The APEC members account for more than half the world 
economy and about half of world trade. Hence any agreement 
that  approached  free  trade  among  the  group  would  be  even 
more far-reaching, in trade terms, than the European Union 
or  the  North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement  (NAFTA).  It 
would be much more extensive than any of the global liberal-
izing compacts previously negotiated in the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or envisaged in the current Doha 
Round in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Doha remains 
highly desirable, of course, and the APEC leaders reaffirmed 
their commitment to its success, but the FTAAP would be by far 
the best available “Plan B” to restart widespread trade-liberal-
izing momentum if the multilateral process fails to proceed in 
Geneva.
The FTAAP idea has been actively promoted by the APEC 
Business  Advisory  Council  (ABAC)  since  2004  as  the  only 
means by which APEC could achieve its signature Bogor goals, 
adopted in 1993 and reaffirmed every year since (including at 
Hanoi), of achieving “free and open trade and investment in the 
region.” It has suddenly become a focal point of official activity 
because of major shifts in policy positions by several key member 
economies.
The United States took the lead in promoting the initia-
tive, and the leaders unanimously endorsed President George W. 
Bush’s call to give it “serious consideration” in a speech in Singa-
pore just before the summit. Japan welcomed the idea along with 
its own recent proposal for an “economic partnership agreement” 
among the 16 leading Asian countries (including India, which is 
not a member of APEC). Australia, which will play a key role as 
chairman of APEC over the coming year, reiterated its support. 
So did Canada and Mexico, two of the six largest APEC econo-
mies and traders, along with several smaller members.1 
This enhanced interest in a new Asia-Pacific trade initiative 
is in turn motivated by five major developments. First, the lassi-
tude of the Doha Round negotiations raises major doubts about 
the viability of worldwide liberalization and even the WTO as an 
institution. Second, especially for the United States, the increas-
ing  momentum  toward  trade  liberalization  within  Asia  itself 
raises the specter of major new discrimination and an unstable 
three-bloc world that could, in the memorable words of former 
Secretary of State James Baker, “draw a line down the middle of 
the Pacific.” Third, the even wider proliferation of bilateral and 
subregional preferential trade pacts, which is likely to acceler-
1. A number of smaller APEC member economies had already endorsed the 
FTAAP at the APEC summit in Santiago in 2004 “if the large countries were 
to do so as well.” This group includes at least Australia, Chile, New Zealand, 
Singapore, and Taiwan.
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ate if Doha indeed fails, will further erode the multilateral 
system; those who worry about the “spaghetti bowl” of such 
deals should strongly support an FTAAP, which can subsume 
many  of  them  under  a  single  umbrella.  Fourth,  even  the 
Asians skeptical of the specific FTAAP idea welcome the active 
engagement of the United States in the region via such a bold 
new initiative. Fifth, APEC has floundered badly in pursuing 
its own liberalization goals and has been totally ineffectual in 
supporting Doha. The FTAAP initiative provides an effective 
response to all five concerns.
APEC’s consideration of the FTAAP possibility needs to 
move ahead quickly for a series of reasons. Perhaps the most 
important is that serious APEC pursuit of an FTAAP is the 
most likely spur to resumption of the Doha Round negotia-
tions. The countries that represent the primary barriers to a 
successful Doha Round all lie outside APEC: the European 
Union, Brazil, India, and some of the African nations. Hence 
the prospect of a new APEC liberalization initiative would 
strengthen the outlook for Doha by focusing the recalcitrants 
on the risk of facing substantial new discrimination if they 
continue to block a successful WTO outcome. This prospect 
is even greater than at the final stages of the Uruguay Round, 
when “only” the European Union needed to be shocked into 
cooperation by the “free trade in the region” commitment of 
APEC’s initial Seattle summit. To achieve this result, APEC 
will have to advance from the current stage of “serious consid-
eration” and “further studies” of a “long-term prospect” to 
active discussion, and preferably full-fledged negotiation, of 
the concept.
The FTAAP initiative also needs to proceed swiftly because 
of the domestic political situation in the United States, inten-
sified by the sweeping victory of the Democrats in the latest 
congressional elections. It was always going to be difficult for 
the administration to win extension of the president’s trade 
promotion authority (TPA) when it expires in the summer 
of 2007, without which the United States cannot participate 
in any significant international commercial negotiations. But 
that prospect is now even more daunting. The administra-
tion will have to present a realistic prospect for at least one 
major trade initiative if it is to have any chance of obtaining 
congressional  approval.  Failure  or  continued  suspension  of 
Doha, or even progress toward a mini-package for the round 
that would provide few tangible benefits for the United States, 
would leave the FTAAP as the only candidate to play that 
role. America’s trading partners in the Asia-Pacific region have 
a deep interest in the extension of TPA, to keep the United 
States engaged in liberalizing trade initiatives and to maintain 
active US participation in their region, and can substantially 
boost that prospect by accelerating APEC’s movement toward 
an FTAAP in early 2007.
In addition, the prospect of a Democratic president in 
2009  raises  questions  concerning  the  attitude  of  the  next 
administration,  in  addition  to  Congress,  toward  pursuing 
proglobalization initiatives. Hence it would behoove US trad-
ing partners to engage in an active FTAAP process with the 
supportive Bush administration and move the effort as far as 
possible while it remains in office. Just as President Bill Clin-
ton felt compelled to complete the NAFTA when he inherited 
it from his Republican predecessor in 1993, any new US presi-
dent would be under a similar obligation with an FTAAP if its 
deliberations were already well under way.
To be sure, other important obstacles could derail this 
potentially  historic  initiative.  The  APEC  leaders  at  Hanoi 
envisaged the FTAAP only as “a long-term prospect,” whereas, 
for the reasons just indicated, it may have to proceed quickly 
if it is to proceed at all. Their officials could effectively bury 
the idea if they let themselves be slowed by APEC’s traditional 
consensus approach and fail to create innovative mechanisms, 
including the use of independent outside experts, to help with 
the mandated studies and if they fail to conduct substantive 
discussions of the proposal while the studies are being carried 
out. Decisions must be made on the agenda of issues to be 
included and especially whether to seek the high standards 
of US free trade agreements (FTAs) or the lower standards 
of  China’s  FTAs  or  the  middle  road  of  Japan’s  “economic 
partnership agreements.” APEC will have to admit that it is 
a negotiating institution, as it clearly already is, but must also 
contemplate undertaking binding commitments for the first 
time.2
2. For skeptical appraisals, see Morrison (2006) and Aggarwal (2006). It 
should be noted, however, that Aggarwal’s analysis, on which Morrison’s 
conclusions largely rely, suggests that the United States could no longer be 
counted on to support any large multilateral trade liberalization, so his views 
apply as much to the Doha Round as to an FTAAP.
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The  single  largest  question  is  probably  the  position 
of China. Its support, on top of that of the United States, 
Japan,  and  the  other  APEC  members  noted  above,  would 
clinch  the  launch  of  serious  negotiations.  However,  China 
expressed some skepticism about the issue at Hanoi. It cited 
two concerns: a possible adverse effect on the Doha Round 
and a delay in implementing APEC’s own Bogor goals. China 
has not shown much interest in Doha, however, and there is 
obviously no prospect for achieving “free and open trade and 
investment in the region” by the Bogor target date of 2010 for 
advanced member countries. Hence China’s concerns must lie 
elsewhere.3 
Perhaps China mainly wants to continue emphasizing its 
bilateral and regional trade pacts with other Asian countries, 
which are undertaken primarily for political reasons and are of 
low economic quality, instead of pursuing an FTAAP with its 
broader geographical scope and presumably higher standards. 
Perhaps  it  is  reluctant  to  include Taiwan,  which  has  been 
accepted as a full participant in all APEC activities since 1991 
so long as they are clearly “economic” rather than “political.” 
Such  considerations  would  be  extremely  short-sighted 
on China’s part, in light of its escalating trade conflicts with 
the United States4 and a number of other APEC members. 
These conflicts are growing rapidly, in light of China’s large 
and rapidly expanding trade surpluses and the increasing criti-
cisms of its remaining trade barriers as it maintains 10 percent 
growth and becomes the world’s third largest trading country. 
Such concerns could be at least partly defused by its entering 
into comprehensive liberalizing and rule-making negotiations 
via an FTAAP. Moreover, if most of the other APEC members 
come to support the idea, China would not want to be viewed 
as throwing its weight around by blocking the initiative. In the 
end, President Hu Jintao did not dissent from the agreement 
of the leaders at Hanoi to consider an FTAAP, so its definitive 
view is yet to emerge.
The  initial  step  taken  by  the  APEC  leaders  in  Hanoi 
toward creation of an FTAAP could turn out to be one of the 
most significant in the history of the world economy and even 
of world politics. Alternatively, it could fizzle into irrelevance 
like  many  of  the  group’s  past  pronouncements.  Decisions 
3. It is quite plausible, however, that China wants to preserve Bogor’s distinc-
tion between advanced countries (which are supposed to liberalize by 2010) 
and self-declared developing countries (which are given until 2020 to do so).
4. See C. Fred Bergsten, “A Clash of the Titans Could Hurt Us All,” op-ed in 
the Financial Times, August 2, 200.
. The most authoritative Chinese statement to date on the FTAAP concludes 
that “China would undoubtedly benefit from joining a (high-quality) agree-
ment and therefore would be likely to join,” though it also indicates that 
China’s trade policy priority is clearly its regional FTAs. See Sheng Bin (2006).
taken by the key APEC economies over the next few months 
will determine the outcome and perhaps with it the prospects 
for US trade policy and the global trading system for years to 
come.
The Case for a free Trade area 
of The asia PaCifiC
The case for an FTAAP is well known and very powerful. First, 
implementation  of  an  FTAAP  would  represent  a  gigantic 
liberalization of trade in the world’s largest and most dynamic 
region.  All  member  economies  would  derive  large  benefits 
as a result. An earlier study prepared for ABAC shows that 
every APEC economy gains more from an FTAAP than from 
nondiscriminatory liberalization by APEC, the only alternative 
modality for pursuing the Bogor goals on a regionwide basis 
and for revitalizing APEC’s trade agenda. It also shows that 
almost all East Asian economies (including the three large 
Northeast Asians) gain more from an FTAAP than from an 
“ASEAN Plus 3” or East Asia Free Trade Area (Scollay 2004, 
especially 2–30 and table 3).
A truly Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific would also 
generate much greater aggregate economic benefits than any 
conceivable  multilateral/WTO  liberalization,  as  its  sizable 
gains for the large number of participating economies more 
than offset the losses to some nonmembers. The Doha Round, 
like the Uruguay Round and its predecessors, would at best 
achieve incremental liberalization of existing barriers. Since 
APEC economies account for more than half of world output 
and trade, elimination of all barriers between them would 
provide a much larger global payoff than any realistic Doha 
outcome. Even if an FTAAP contained the modest exceptions 
that are normal in major trade pacts, the gains for the world 
economy as a whole would be far superior to those attainable 
via any plausible WTO negotiation. Those gains would, of 
course,  accrue  primarily  to  the  members  of  the  FTAAP 
itself, and some nonmembers would lose due to the resulting 
discrimination against them. The latter would then be likely 
to seek to associate with the FTAAP or negotiate their own 
regional agreements, or more likely pursue significant further 
multilateral liberalization via the standard logic of “competi-
tive liberalization” (Evenett and Meier 2006), which leads to 
the next argument for an FTAAP.
Second, as already noted, active pursuit of the FTAAP 
idea  by  APEC  can  promote  the  prospects  for  a  successful 
Doha Round and may indeed be the most likely catalyst for 
restarting those talks. APEC’s consideration of an FTAAP can 
thus enhance the prospects of achieving the modest but highly 
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ful WTO round—as long as the APEC members continue to 
make clear that this outcome remains their top trade policy 
priority (as their predecessors did vis-à-vis the Uruguay Round 
in 1993–94). If APEC would then follow through and actu-
ally create an FTAAP, to maintain the forward momentum 
of  liberalization  by  building  on  a  successful  Doha  Round, 
its far larger “WTO plus” gains would accrue in addition to 
those produced by Doha. The resulting discrimination against 
outsiders would then likely prompt those outsiders to insist 
on launching another multilateral WTO round to reduce the 
new preferences (just as the United States insisted on the three 
major postwar GATT rounds in large part to reduce the pref-
erences stemming from the creation and subsequent expan-
sion of the European Union). The European Union might also 
pursue a new “bilateral” pact of its own with East Asia, which 
would liberalize trade further and add pressure on the United 
States to launch another global round. A successful FTAAP 
process could thus make a multiple contribution to global trade 
liberalization and economic welfare.
If Doha were to fail anyway, despite an APEC effort to 
revive it via the FTAAP, the FTAAP initiative would provide 
the APEC member economies with a ready Plan B to restore 
momentum for trade liberalization.6 This would be extremely 
important, especially for the trade-dependent economies of 
the Asia-Pacific region, in a world in which the global bicycle 
had toppled and the specter of a retreat toward protectionism 
was becoming apparent. The FTAAP idea thus simultaneously 
offers a spur to Doha and a ready alternative if it were to fail. 
If the Asian members of APEC were to block this particular 
Plan B, the United States would almost certainly turn toward 
Europe and Latin America to forge new megaregional pacts in 
those directions.7
6. See C. Fred Bergsten, “Plan B for World Trade: Go Regional,” op-ed in the 
Financial Times, August 16, 2006.
7. Alternative “Plan Bs” have already been suggested by the German govern-
ment, in the form of a renewed effort to forge deeper transatlantic economic 
ties, and by Robert Zoellick through linking together the existing US FTAs in 
Third, an FTAAP could over time sweep under one roof 
the exploding proliferation of bilateral and subregional pref-
erential trade arrangements (PTAs) throughout the area (and 
help head off the even further proliferation that is highly likely 
in the absence of an FTAAP alternative if Doha fails). It would 
eliminate, in whole or in part, the increasing discrimination 
that such pacts are producing within the region. In particular, 
it could start rolling together the conflicting rules of origin, 
which are becoming so costly to business and trade, just as 
the Pan-European Cumulative System in 1997 multilateral-
ized the panoply of PTAs then existing in Europe (Baldwin 
2006). 
Some PTAs would probably continue to exist even with 
an FTAAP. However, the FTAAP could follow the precedent 
of  the  other  megaregional  trade  negotiation  that  is  being 
pursued in a geographical area with a number of preexisting 
PTAs, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), whose 
negotiators  agreed  that  while  the  new  arrangement  would 
not displace preexisting subregional integration agreements, 
the provisions of the latter would prevail only to the extent 
that “the rights and obligations under those agreements are 
not covered by or go beyond the rights and obligations of the 
FTAA” (Stephenson 2006, 9). It would also be highly desirable 
for the APEC members to declare a moratorium on the launch 
of any new PTAs once they had commenced negotiations on 
an FTAAP (including to free up the necessary resources within 
the member governments to pursue the FTAAP).
This benefit of an FTAAP is especially important in light 
of the steady movement of the East Asian members of APEC 
toward establishing their own regionwide PTA. Creation of an 
East Asian Community, or even an East Asian Free Trade Area, 
could contribute substantially to liberalization and thus have 
a positive impact on the world economy. It would also gener-
ate major new discrimination within the broader Asia-Pacific 
setting, however, and thus, as with the Mahathir proposal for 
an East Asia Economic Group in the early 1990s, threaten to 
“draw a line down the middle of the Pacific.”9 Previous analy-
ses (based on Scollay 2001) suggested that the United States 
Latin America into an “Association of American Free Trade Agreements” (see 
Robert B. Zoellick, “Happily Ever AAFTA,” Wall Street Journal, January , 
2007, A17).    
. A similar positive case can be made for an Asian Monetary Fund, which 
seems to be emerging as a result of the expansion and multilateralization of the 
network of bilateral swap arrangements under the Chiang Mai Initiative.
9. Another possible tendency at present is for the China-Japan rivalry to create 
a dividing line within Asia: between a “coastline perimeter” consisting of Ja-
pan, Taiwan, Australia, and perhaps a few others vis-à-vis a China-dominated 
“mainland bloc.” This division too would be extremely dangerous, perhaps 
even more so in terms of possible intra-Asian conflict that (as in the past) 
could draw in the United States, and an FTAAP would also be of great help in 
countering this risk.
Even if an FTAAP contained the 
modest exceptions that are normal in 
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could lose as much as $2 billion of annual exports solely from 
the static discriminatory effects of an East Asian Free Trade 
Area, which could add substantially to the protectionist and 
isolationist pressures that are already of worrisome strength in 
the United States.
This outcome will occur whether or not East Asian region-
al integration formally produces a single economic entity, such 
as an “ASEAN Plus 3” free trade area or Japan’s recent proposal 
for an “ASEAN Plus 6” economic partnership agreement. The 
overlapping  network  of  existing  and  potential  agreements, 
especially the “10+1+1+1” arrangements between ASEAN and 
the three Northeast Asian powers, will move substantially in 
the same direction. Such new trade discrimination across the 
Pacific could also have important security effects, inevitably 
loosening the current transpacific alliances (e.g., US-Japan), 
not least because of negative congressional reactions to such 
Asia-only initiatives (regardless of the parallel Western Hemi-
sphere–only initiatives being conducted by the United States 
itself). With the rise in economic and political importance of 
the Asian economies, and the tensions already existing over 
some elements of US foreign policy, the impact of such Asia-
Pacific disintegration would be far more costly today—to both 
sides of the Pacific—than would have been the case in the 
early 1990s. 
Somewhat similar implications could accrue from the de 
facto completion of an FTAA on the eastern edge of the Pacific. 
Formal negotiations for a full-blown FTAA have stalled, but 
the de facto integration of the Western Hemisphere is already 
far advanced. The United States has expanded its FTA ties 
beyond NAFTA to include Chile, all of Central America, and 
the larger countries in the Andean Community (Colombia and 
Peru). A failed Doha Round could prompt US-Brazil negotia-
tions as well. Asian involvement in Latin America, though it 
is now growing rapidly, has historically been much smaller 
than US involvement in Asia so the impact of this element of 
Asia-Pacific disintegration is considerably less acute. However, 
disintegration of the Asia-Pacific region is being fed from the 
eastern as well as western edge of the Pacific in equally messy 
but equally discriminatory ways.10
The United States has no basis for asking to participate 
in the East Asian summits, which have now become a regular 
feature of intra-Asian diplomacy. Asians are not invited to 
the Summits of the Americas. Neither Americans nor Asians 
are invited to the summits of the European Union. Both the 
United States and the Asians do, however, have a clear right 
10. The US network of FTAs is generally of broader coverage and deeper 
liberalization than those in East Asia, so its preferential impact is presumably 
greater.
to  be  consulted  about  the  hemispheric  initiatives  of  their 
transpacific neighbors in light of their close historical ties and 
especially in light of their commitments to each other to move 
to “free and open trade and investment” in the Asia-Pacific 
region as a whole. They have an obligation to conduct such 
consultations with full faith and transparency and to consider 
new ideas, such as an FTAAP, that would obviate the major 
costs and risks of East Asia–only or Western Hemisphere–only 
integration. APEC is, of course, the natural venue for such 
consultations. A failure to conduct them would be extremely 
risky for all APEC economies.
One clear lesson from the history of regional economic 
initiatives is that it is important to embed them in broader 
geographic contexts to avoid the risk that they may subse-
quently resist liberalization toward nonmembers and become 
closed blocs. The European Union and its predecessors, by 
far the most important preferential trade agreement (and, of 
course, much more) ever implemented, have been sufficiently 
nested in the GATT/WTO system that they could not resist 
global steps to temper their discrimination against outsiders. 
In addition, the integrating Europeans were embedded in an 
extremely  thick  network  of  transatlantic  relationships  with 
the United States and Canada, including most importantly 
the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), but many more as well. These 
institutions virtually eliminated the risk of “drawing a line 
down the middle of the Atlantic” despite the historic degree 
of integration that the European Union was in the process of 
achieving. By contrast, the apparent desire of the Southern 
Cone  Common  Market  (Mercosur)  to  maintain  its  subre-
gional preferences and to resist reducing them in any broader 
framework, even with full reciprocity, probably derives at least 
partly from the absence of such broader nesting. 
The faltering of the WTO system reduces its potential 
for limiting the risks inherent in preferential megaregional 
groupings like a de facto East Asian Free Trade Area or FTAA. 
Especially in light of the salience of transpacific relationships 
traced above, and drawing on the historical lessons from the 
transatlantic relationship, it thus seems essential to embed new 
Pacific-Asia and Western Hemisphere subregional agreements 
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within a broader Asia-Pacific context. For the same reason, it 
would be highly desirable for an FTAAP to be embedded in 
an effective WTO system, and FTAAP members should do 
everything they can to strengthen or, if necessary after a failure 
of Doha, to revive that global institution.
Fourth, launch of an FTAAP initiative could revitalize 
APEC itself. Whatever its record in other areas, APEC has 
declined steeply in both regional and global relevance as its 
inability to effectively pursue its own Bogor goals has become 
(painfully) apparent. In choosing to become solely a cheer-
leader for the WTO and Doha, without any trade agenda of 
its own, APEC has abdicated the significant role that it played 
in global as well as regional trade policy from 1993 at least 
through 1997 (vis-à-vis the Uruguay Round, as already noted, 
and in both negotiating most of the far-reaching Informa-
tion Technology Agreement and agreeing to pursue complete 
liberalization for nine important sectors [which unfortunately 
failed later] in the teeth of the Asian financial crisis). It has 
looked on helplessly as its member economies pursue their 
own PTAs without reference to, or even notice of, APEC and 
the  commitments  they  had  supposedly  accepted  under  its 
aegis.11 
This weakening of APEC should be of major concern to 
all its member economies. The rapid growth of economic (and 
broader) tensions between the United States and China, and 
the increased risks of Asia-Pacific disintegration due to the 
advent of Asia-only (and perhaps Americas-only) economic 
arrangements,  underline  the  need  for  effective  transpacific 
linkages and institutional ties for security as well as economic 
reasons. Japan, Korea, and the ASEAN countries all seek to 
maintain active US engagement in the region as a “hedging 
strategy” against the rise, and possible hegemonial intentions, 
of China. 
APEC is the only existing organization that can fill that 
role, in contrast to the large number of transatlantic institu-
tions that precluded the parallel risk of “drawing a line down 
the middle of the Atlantic” as the European Union formed 
and steadily deepened its integration. To pursue an FTAAP, 
APEC would, of course, have to acknowledge that it is already 
a “negotiating forum.” This would be nothing new for APEC 
since it has already negotiated inter alia the Bogor Declara-
tion in 1994, the Information Technology Agreement in 1996 
(which subsequently became binding via the WTO), and the 
11. There is an understandable and laudable desire in many quarters to 
strengthen both the APEC Secretariat and the level of attention paid to APEC 
within member economies. The only way to achieve these goals, however, 
is to restore the substantive importance of APEC and thus raise its priority 
for members. Serious pursuit of an FTAAP would substantially heighten the 
salience of APEC to all participating economies and thus inevitably expand 
their dedication of resources to the institution.
original sectoral liberalization agenda in 1997. APEC would 
also have to be prepared to move toward binding rather than 
purely voluntary commitments, which would be a much more 
significant step. Any new initiative that would restore purpose 
and credibility to APEC in such ways, like an FTAAP, would 
generate benefits that range far beyond the gains, substantial 
as they would be, for that initiative itself.12
A  corollary  is  that  an  FTAAP  could  be  launched  by 
less than the full membership of APEC. Such “21 – x” and 
“pioneer” initiatives have taken place in APEC on other issues, 
such as the APEC Business Travel Card Program. An encour-
aging precedent is the Information Technology Agreement, 
which aimed only to include a “critical mass” of countries 
rather than the full membership of APEC (or, subsequently, 
the WTO) and came into effect with coverage of 0 to 90 
percent of the relevant trade (and most-favored-nation exten-
sion to the rest despite their free riding). 
The  other  new  megaregional  negotiation,  toward  an 
FTAA,  de  facto  proceeded  in  such  a  manner.  The  all-in 
approach envisaged when the FTAA was launched in 1994 has 
given way to a series of “bilateral” deals between the United 
States, on the one hand, and several separate sets of partners in 
Latin America, starting with Chile and more recently adding 
the Central Americans, the Dominican Republic, and most 
of  the  Andean  Pact  countries.  Coupled  with  the  previous 
NAFTA  and  the  Caribbean  Basin  Initiative,  this  amounts 
to something of a “34 – x” sequence that now encompasses 
virtually the entire Western Hemisphere except for the Merco-
sur membership. Pragmatism might require that an FTAAP 
proceed in a similar way, of course, one would hope, with the 
largest possible membership at the outset.13
If APEC institutional hurdles could not be overcome, an 
FTAAP could be pursued outside the organization by whatever 
group of APEC member economies chose to do so. This would 
again parallel the experience with the FTAA, where no APEC-
type institution existed as a venue for the talks.14 Proceeding in 
this manner would forgo the benefits of strengthening APEC 
and indeed would probably weaken it even further (perhaps 
12. APEC will also face the issue of expanding its membership in 2007 as 
its 10-year moratorium on new entrants expires. The key applicant is India, 
which has led much of the resistance to liberalization in the Doha Round. As 
clearly seen from the history of the European Union, including at present, 
broadening of an international institution makes its deepening all the more 
difficult. The European Union has traditionally resolved that conflict by 
adopting major deepening initiatives before taking on its next set of members, 
and APEC should do the same by proceeding with the FTAAP before adding 
India or anybody else.
13. Sheng Bin (2006) opines that China might “join the FTAAP at a later 
time” if it proceeded without China at the start. 
14. The Organization of American States is primarily a political body and be-
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fatally) by taking the main Asia-Pacific initiative elsewhere. 
The United States and other APEC member economies have 
nevertheless committed to pursue a “Free Trade Area of the 
Asia Pacific” rather than an “APEC Free Trade Area,” and this 
alternative route is available. 
In sum, the substantive case for an FTAAP initiative is far 
stronger now than when the idea was initially broached by the 
ABAC in 2004. The leaders recognized this increased salience 
in their decision at Hanoi to begin considering the proposal. 
Care must always be taken, however, to distinguish among 
its three operational phases: studying the concept, launching 
discussion/consultation/negotiation on it, and actually imple-
menting it. It will be necessary to carefully calibrate these three 
phases, to the regional and global contexts that exist at the 
time of the crucial decisions on the idea, but each sequential 
phase of the project could have at least some of the beneficial 
effects described here. The substantive case is very strong and, 
augmented by the recent political developments within the 
United States described earlier in this brief, argues for APEC’s 
moving as rapidly as possible to the stage of discussing the idea 
actively even while still studying its full dimensions. 
The fTaaP and The doha round
I  have  already  suggested  that  the  launch  of  an  FTAAP 
initiative by APEC could both have a highly positive effect 
in galvanizing a successful outcome for the Doha Round and 
offer a fallback Plan B if Doha were to fail. The relationship 
between the FTAAP and Doha is so central, however, and 
fears that any serious APEC consideration of an FTAAP could 
undermine Doha have previously been such a major factor 
in inhibiting APEC action on the idea that it deserves more 
detailed analysis. I will do so by tracing the implications for 
the FTAAP idea of the alternative scenarios that now seem 
plausible for the Doha talks as they approach their current 
deadline, driven by the expiration of US negotiating authority 
in July 2007.
My colleagues Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott (2006) 
have  developed  a  careful  analysis  of  the  three  most  likely 
outcomes for Doha, and the prognosis seems even gloomier 
now than when they wrote a year ago. The three possibilities are
•	 outright failure or collapse,
•	 a minimalist “success,” or
•	 a substantial further delay, at least until the end of  
2007 and perhaps well beyond the next US elections in 
late 200. 
I and my colleagues at the Peterson Institute for Interna-
tional Economics, especially Hufbauer and Schott, are very 
strong supporters of the Doha Round. We have indeed partici-
pated actively in developing many of its components and have 
testified and written incessantly to promote a substantively 
successful outcome. We fully realize, from our long experience 
with earlier GATT rounds, that all such multilateral negotia-
tions have looked exceedingly bleak prior to their more-or-less 
successful conclusions. But our best analytical judgments now 
lead us to see a strong possibility of a demise of the Doha 
Round, which we do with great reluctance and only because 
we believe it is imperative for the world to begin planning on 
the basis of the real prospects for such an outcome.
We  doubt  that  the  major  governments,  especially  the 
United States and the European Union, would want to explic-
itly admit the failure of the Doha Round and accept a formal 
collapse of the negotiations. However, the developing countries 
could trigger such an outcome by again rejecting the offers of 
the rich nations as grossly inadequate—as they correctly did 
at the Cancún ministerial in 2003. Even the US negotiators, 
pushed by Congress and the US business community, might 
have to formally reject a deal that failed to achieve at least a 
substantial portion of their negotiating objectives. Hence the 
first option is, unfortunately, a real possibility.
The  consequences  for  the  world  trading  system  of  an 
outright failure of Doha would be devastating (Schott 2006). 
Protectionist relapses could be expected everywhere, especially 
as the global trade imbalances (which always spawn protec-
tionism in the United States) continue to expand and particu-
larly if key economies soften, with unemployment rising, over 
the coming couple of years.1 A further proliferation of PTAs 
could be expected as governments try to find some politically 
viable modality for resuming trade liberalization (and escape 
any semblance of multilateral constraint on low-quality deals 
motivated primarily by foreign policy objectives). Under these 
1. Protectionist pressure will rise particularly sharply in Europe if the inevi-
table large decline in the value of the dollar, which is an essential component 
of any significant correction of the large and growing international imbalances, 
takes place mainly against the euro because China and other Asian surplus 
countries continue to block significant appreciation of their own currencies.
If Doha were to fail, the FTAAP initiative 
would provide the APEC member 
economies with a ready Plan B to restore 
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circumstances, a Plan B would be desperately needed. Launch 
of  an  FTAAP  would  be  important  in  this  context,  indeed 
almost imperative, especially as transpacific trade ties would be 
the most likely to suffer in the context of a renewed outbreak 
of (especially US) protectionism and accelerated movement 
toward an East Asian trading bloc (that would in turn feed 
even further US protectionism).
A minimalist outcome, the second possibility, is clearly 
possible. WTO Director General Pascal Lamy signaled such 
a strategy in his report on the key Hong Kong ministerial of 
December 200 to a conference at the Institute for Interna-
tional  Economics  in  February  2006,  and  Deputy  Director 
General  Rufus  Yerxa  repeated  the  concept  in  a  speech  in 
Washington in May 2006. Their message was essentially that, 
facing profound difficulties in meeting the original goals of the 
round or even advancing the negotiations beyond where they 
had stalemated over the previous year, the WTO membership 
should “declare victory and go home.”
There are two problems with this approach. The first is 
that the offers to date are quite minimal, and it is doubtful 
that the world as a whole—as opposed to the ministers who 
would try to sell such an outcome—would view it as much 
better than an explicit failure. The second, which compounds 
the first, is that some of the present “offers,” such as the US 
willingness to limit agricultural subsidies in its next farm bill 
if the European Union and others significantly expand market 
access in that sector, would almost certainly be withdrawn 
unless substantially better proposals emanate from their trad-
ing partners.
Hence, any “declared victory” would be quite hollow and 
extremely difficult to sell. The global trade policy consequenc-
es might not be quite as bad as under an outright failure but 
neither would they be attractive to contemplate. Most of the 
major trade problems would remain unresolved, and the devel-
oping countries, in particular, would (rightly) feel betrayed 
for a second time. The resulting bad taste all around would 
make it virtually impossible to contemplate another WTO 
round,16 or even any major sectoral negotiations, in the fore-
seeable future. The bicycle of liberalizing momentum might 
not topple completely, but it would become very wobbly. Plan 
B would still be sorely needed. 
The  third  option,  which  Hufbauer  and  Schott  regard 
16. There have been exhausted cries of “never another round” at the end of 
every previous round negotiated in the GATT/WTO. All three of the previous 
major rounds, however, have been widely viewed as basically successful in 
advancing global liberalization and improving the rules-based trading system. 
Whatever the attitudes at the time of their completion, the rounds thus 
provided a solid foundation for the next round. A minimal outcome from 
Doha, however, let alone its explicit or implicit failure, would radically alter 
this history and raise serious doubts over the future of the entire multilateral 
trading system and its institutional framework.
as the most likely, is extension of the talks from the current 
“deadline” of early 2007 until anywhere from the end of 2007 
(after the next French and Korean elections) to 2009 (after 
the next US elections) or even beyond. This would be similar 
to the end game of the Uruguay Round, which was initially 
scheduled to conclude in 1990 but continued until late 1993 
(after completion of NAFTA and the initial Seattle summit 
of APEC). It would be tantamount to the failure outcome in 
the short run, but, of course, without the definitive finality 
thereof and indeed with some prospect of ultimate success or 
at least renewed effort down the road.
The global trade policy consequences of this quite plau-
sible “outcome” are the most conjectural. They would depend 
partly on whether credible new deadlines could be set. This in 
turn would depend heavily on whether the Congress seemed 
likely to extend the president’s TPA, which would be highly 
uncertain with Doha in suspense due to lack of success and 
hence unlikely to provide much motivation for the United 
States to resume the talks. The victories by the Democrats in 
the congressional elections of 2006 and their potential success 
in the presidential election of 200 inject substantial addition-
al uncertainties into the picture concerning both the extension 
of US negotiating authority in the short run and the basic 
orientation of US trade policy over the medium term.
The launch of an FTAAP in this context could provide 
a  quadruple  benefit.  It  would  represent  a  new  driver  of 
liberalization  to  maintain  forward  momentum.  It  would 
offer a major incentive for Congress—and the US business 
community, which is its most important constituent on these 
issues—to renew TPA and thus enable the United States to 
remain involved in, and, one would hope, provide the needed 
leadership for, the related sets of major trade negotiations. It 
would offer a credible “political jolt” to the rest of the world, 
substantially motivating others to make new offers that would 
revive Doha.17  
If an FTAAP proceeded to fruition even in the wake of a 
reinvigorated and successful Doha Round, perhaps produced 
in part by the launch of the FTAAP itself, it could also, as 
noted above, galvanize a future WTO negotiation to reduce 
the  new  “Doha  plus”  discrimination  that  it  created.  The 
creation of the European Union and its subsequent broad-
ening and deepening were important triggers for all three of 
the major GATT rounds (Kennedy, Tokyo, and Uruguay) of 
the past half century. The initial APEC summit, at Seattle in 
1993, played a crucial role in driving the Uruguay Round to 
its ultimate success. The formal launch of the Bogor goals in 
17. It could also induce others, especially the European Union, to accelerate 
their own FTA strategies, but the magnitude of an FTAAP would also be likely 
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1994, coming just after the completion of the Uruguay Round, 
clearly stimulated successful multilateral/WTO negotiations 
(on telecom and financial services, in particular) for several 
more years; Sir Leon Brittan, the chief EU trade negotiator at 
the time, said repeatedly and publicly that “the EU will not be 
left behind if APEC does what it says it will do” and used the 
specter of APEC discrimination to bring his more recalcitrant 
member states into those global liberalization packages.
Properly managed, an FTAAP could thus provide substan-
tial—and perhaps essential—support to the Doha Round in 
the short run and the global trading system over the longer 
run. It is understandable that some observers have adopted 
a different view and that the APEC leaders have previously 
been cautious in even initiating the FTAAP process for fear 
of  undermining  Doha.  A  sophisticated  understanding  of 
the political economy of trade policy, however, both among 
countries and within the most important ones, points clearly 
to the prospect of mutual reinforcement between an FTAAP 
process and the WTO system. The most crucial test of that 
thesis is the impact of such an interaction in the United States, 
to which I now turn.
The uniTed sTaTes and The fTaaP
The  FTAAP  idea  must  be  credible  if  it  is  to  provide  the 
numerous substantive benefits suggested above. This requires 
the United States and the other major APEC powers, especially 
China and Japan, to eventually endorse and embrace the idea. 
The most salient criticism of the FTAAP to date has been that 
“it will never fly” with the big countries.
The United States is probably the most important single 
variable in this equation. It remains not only the largest APEC 
economy  and  trading  nation  but  the  traditional  leader,  to 
which most of the other members look, on trade policy issues 
at both the global and regional levels. It was the chief driver of 
the Bogor goals at Seattle and at Bogor itself and of their very 
positive interaction with the Uruguay Round in the GATT. 
President Bush’s decision to take the lead in placing the 
FTAAP squarely on the APEC agenda in late 2006 is thus 
an  enormously  important  step  forward.  At  the  same  time, 
however, I have already noted that the rise of the Democrats 
to control of the Congress (and possibly control of the White 
House in two years) raises important new questions about 
overall US trade policy, including this element of it. Though 
virtually all of Asia appears to welcome the renewed focus on 
the region suggested by the president’s initiative, skepticism 
still abounds on whether the United States will stick with it.
The  likely  paths  for  the  Doha  Round  analyzed  above 
will clearly affect the US attitude toward an FTAAP. I and 
my colleagues at the Peterson Institute often criticize the Bush 
administration and do not always support its trade policy, 
but it is clear to us that the administration and the president 
personally are deeply committed to freer trade. They have led 
the way on Doha; indeed, there would be no Doha without 
the United States, including the major battle conducted by 
the administration to win TPA from Congress by the narrow-
est of margins in 2002. The round would have no chance for 
even a minimal success absent the bold initiatives taken by 
the administration, as recently as just before the Hong Kong 
ministerial in late 200, to liberalize agricultural, nonagricul-
tural, and services restrictions around the world, including its 
own. In the summer of 200, it again mobilized all its political 
muscle to win congressional acceptance of the Central Ameri-
can  Free  Trade  Agreement  (CAFTA)  in  the  latest  pitched 
battle between globalization and antiglobalization forces in 
the  United  States.  The  United  States  has  caused  problems 
for the round, to be sure, especially with its unwillingness to 
consider serious reform of its antidumping regime or of trade 
in labor services, or to cut its agricultural subsidies by enough 
to satisfy its trading partners, but overall it has been by far the 
strongest single source of support for Doha.
Moreover, the administration clearly sees trade policy as 
an integral part of its foreign policy and would be unwilling 
to let that central dimension of its global strategy disappear. 
In the specific case of East Asia, it is clearly worried by the 
increased risk of “drawing a line down the middle of the Pacif-
ic,” especially between the United States and China. It has 
become concerned by the “East Asian architecture” movement 
that threatens to erect new discriminatory barriers against US 
trade, how that will affect US security as well as economic 
interests,  and  how  the  United  States  should  respond.  It  is 
virtually inconceivable that the administration would accept 
any  of  the  three  posited  outcomes  of  Doha,  especially  if 
coupled with accelerated movement toward an exclusionary 
East Asian bloc, without mounting a major new trade policy 
initiative, especially with respect to its chief trading partners/
competitors in East Asia. It would surely want to renew the 
One clear lesson from the history of regional 
economic initiatives is that it is important 
to embed them in broader geographic 
contexts to avoid the risk that they may 
subsequently resist liberalization toward 
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momentum toward reducing barriers, maintain its strategy of 
competitive liberalization, and find a basis for extending TPA 
beyond its scheduled expiration in July 2007.1
One possible US response is to launch additional FTAs 
with individual Asian partners. In 2006 Korea and Malaysia 
were added to the list that already included Singapore, Austra-
lia, and Thailand. Indonesia is a favored candidate for subse-
quent  inclusion.  Subsequent  US  trade  representatives  have 
offered to pursue an FTA with Japan once it is ready to put 
agriculture seriously on the table, as Korea has now done, and 
Japan will probably seek such an arrangement if the US-Korea 
talks succeed. 
Another US alternative would be to offer “docking rights” 
to its existing FTAs for APEC members that were willing to 
accept the obligations of the existing agreements. This has 
been a modality for EU enlargement and recently when the 
Dominican  Republic  “docked”  onto  the  FTA  between  the 
United States and Central America. It might be a more practi-
cal way to achieve an eventual FTAAP than an “all in” negotia-
tion from the outset.19 
It would surely be superior for the United States, however, 
and even more so for its Asian partners, to pursue an FTAAP 
instead of adding further to the “spaghetti bowl” of PTAs in 
the region. More US FTAs, including via “docking” to existing 
US FTAs by current nonmembers, would increasingly create 
a  “hub-and-spoke”  network  centered  on  the  United  States 
(and  thus  encourage  further  proliferation  of  similar  “hub-
and-spoke” configurations centered on other major trading 
powers) rather than an integrated Asia-Pacific economy. Simi-
lar proliferation of the network of PTAs would occur if the 
United States, as suggested recently by some Asians, were to 
negotiate its own “10+1” agreement with ASEAN and then 
seek at some later point to consolidate that arrangement with 
the other 10+1 deals that are in place or envisaged with China, 
Japan,  and  Korea  (except  that  ASEAN  would  then  be  the 
unlikely hub of the system).
1. Some observers, particularly within the United States, raise doubts about 
the capacity of the US government, specifically the US trade representative, to 
support a major new negotiating effort like the FTAAP. In a world in which 
the Doha Round was either concluded or suspended, however, the resources 
now being devoted to that enterprise could readily be shifted to an FTAAP, 
which would be addressing the same set of issues. A similar shift of US person-
nel occurred in 1991–92 when the Uruguay Round went into suspended 
animation, and the freed-up resources were largely used to negotiate NAFTA.
19. At the commencement of the APEC strategizing in 1993 that ultimately 
produced the Bogor goals, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore in 
fact proposed that the United States open NAFTA to accession by all APEC 
members and argued that, since some would immediately accept, the entire 
membership would eventually have to do so via the logic of competitive 
liberalization. Some Asians have recently suggested that other APEC members 
could “dock” onto the P-4 FTA, agreed by Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and 
Singapore, but this grouping is clearly too small to provide a foundation for 
APEC-wide arrangements.
Moreover,  this  approach  would  leave  unresolved  the 
central issue of US-China trade and broader economic rela-
tions. Indeed, US pursuit of FTAs throughout East Asia, which 
exclude China, would likely further exacerbate the Washing-
ton-Beijing tensions: It would add an economic dimension 
to the “surround China” strategy that the United States is 
already pursuing in the security sphere, with its recent over-
tures to India along with the deepening of the Japan alliance, 
which could trigger additional Chinese pushback in both the 
economic (more PTAs) and security arenas.
Both the international and domestic politics of the FTAAP 
issue in the United States will thus turn importantly on how 
it will be seen as affecting the US-China relationship. That 
relationship is clearly on a very risky path. The bilateral trade 
imbalance, which exceeded $230 billion in 2006 and can only 
increase because US imports from China are six times greater 
than US exports to China (which is twice as large as that 
US-Japan ratio ever became), is irrelevant per se in economic 
terms but toxic in domestic political terms. Moreover, the 
bilateral position now accurately reflects the global position 
of the two countries: Each is running a worldwide current 
account imbalance that exceeds 7 percent of its GNP and is 
rising rapidly. China’s global current account surplus doubled 
in 200 and may have risen as high as $20 billion, about 9 
percent of its GDP and by far the largest of any country in the 
world, in 2006. 
The currencies of both countries are severely misaligned, 
with dollar overvaluation and renminbi undervaluation of at 
least 20 percent.20 Such conditions in the United States have 
traditionally been accurate predictors of major protectionist 
reactions. At the present time, the United States has already 
slapped controls on six sectors of Chinese exports (apparel, 
color television sets, furniture, semiconductors, shrimp, and 
textiles). The House of Representatives has passed anti-China 
legislation (the English bill in July 200), and the Senate has 
20. On a trade-weighted average basis. The undervaluation of the renminbi 
bilaterally against the dollar is probably about twice as great.
The launch of an FTAAP would offer a 
major incentive for Congress to renew 
TPA and thus enable the United States to 
remain involved in, and one would hope 
provide the needed leadership for, the 
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considered at least two sweeping across-the-board proposals 
(Grassley-Baucus  and  Schumer-Graham)—some  of  which, 
if implemented, would violate US commitments under the 
WTO  and  justify  Chinese  retaliation.  These  developments 
could trigger a trade war between the two chief drivers of 
the world economy over the past five years and would almost 
surely provide added impetus for China and the rest of East 
Asia to pursue Asia-only trade initiatives.21 
All this is occurring with a booming US economy that 
is enjoying full employment. The prospect for US trade policy 
is frightening if in a year or two the United States experiences a 
combination of slowing growth (or even recession), rising jobless-
ness, a global current account deficit of $1 trillion or so, and a 
bilateral imbalance with China of $300 billion to $400 billion. 
A substantial realignment of the exchange rate between the 
renminbi and the dollar is an essential ingredient of any reso-
lution of the economic tension between China and the United 
States, whatever changes are made in the trade policies of the 
two countries.22 
At the same time, China can make a powerful case that 
its trade policy is not a major problem. China is one of the 
most open of all developing countries: Its trade-to-GDP ratio 
is more than 60 percent, double that of the United States and 
triple that of Japan. Its realized tariff average, the ratio of its 
customs collections to GDP, was 2.2 percent in 2004. Even its 
nominal tariff average is only about 10 percent. Virtually all 
import quotas have been eliminated, and licensing schemes 
are being simplified. China clearly needs to follow through 
more aggressively on some of its WTO commitments, espe-
cially with respect to intellectual property rights and some 
of its other regulatory policies, and would be well advised to 
respond to the external pressures by leading a new effort to 
successfully conclude the Doha Round. But its overall trade 
policy regime is not the main problem.23
The  central  strategic  issue  for  the  United  States,  with 
respect to China policy as well as overall trade and foreign 
economic policy, is how best to head off the potential confron-
tation  despite  these  realities  of  China’s  trade  policy.24  The 
21. This would be even more likely if the European Union joined the United 
States in applying new trade restrictions to China, and perhaps East Asia more 
broadly, which could easily result if China continues to block meaningful ap-
preciation of its currency (and thus the currencies of other East Asians) so that 
the next major dollar decline occurs primarily against the euro and pushes it to 
even larger overvaluation against Asia.
22. See Morris Goldstein and Nicholas R. Lardy, “China’s Revaluation Shows 
Size Really Matters,” op-ed in the Financial Times, July 22, 200.
23. These data and a more extended analysis can be found in Center for 
Strategic and International Studies and Institute for International Economics 
(2006, especially chapter 4).
24. As opposed to China’s currency policy, which does raise major problems 
because of the country’s massive intervention in the foreign exchange markets 
current bilateral strategy is proving to be extremely frustrat-
ing; the results, as with Japan for three difficult decades, are 
at best minimal and case-by-case, while the Chinese partner, 
even more than Japan, resents overt pressure and may even be 
less responsive as a result. Resort to the WTO dispute settle-
ment  mechanism  can  help  resolve  individual  quarrels,  but 
WTO rules do not cover many of the key issues, and again 
the best possible outcome is case-by-case and drawn out over 
extended periods. President Hu Jintao’s visit to Washington in 
April 2006 produced no serious discussion of these issues let 
alone any resolution of them, and the initial meeting of the 
new Strategic Economic Dialogue in December 2006, chaired 
by Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson and Vice Minister 
Wu Yi, made no substantive progress either.
Hence there is compelling logic for the United States and 
China to bring their trade policy problems within the broader 
regional construct of APEC and an FTAAP. The idea should 
not be presented as mainly, or even importantly, aimed at 
resolving the US-China dispute; doing so might even backfire 
by making the other APEC members, as well as China and the 
United States themselves, uncomfortable with the prospect. 
Fortunately, the rationale for the FTAAP is straightforward 
and clear as developed earlier in this policy brief. 
But it would greatly behoove both the United States and 
China to embed their trade policy disputes into a broader 
context that would offer the promise of eventual elimination 
of most or all barriers between them. For the United States, the 
standard logic that has always persuaded Congress to support 
such agreements would again prevail: that the partner coun-
try’s barriers are much higher and thus the United States can 
only gain on balance from their mutual elimination, even if 
further adjustment is required in a few US sectors.2 Moreover, 
(“manipulation”) that blocks any substantial rise in the value of the renminbi 
(and thus other Asian currencies) and thus perpetuates and exacerbates the 
severe misalignment described above.
2. The United States must also do a better job of supporting that adjustment 
and cushioning the transition costs for displaced American workers. A com-
prehensive agenda is proposed in Bergsten and the Institute for International 
Economics (200, especially chapters 1 and 10).
A sophisticated understanding of 
the political economy of trade policy 
points clearly to the prospect of 
mutual reinforcement between an 
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other APEC members share the US desire to reduce China’s 
import restrictions and other governmental trade intervention 
and could be expected to support most of the US negotiating 
efforts. For China, a liberalization of its remaining restrictions 
that was phased in over time would produce the culmination 
of its brilliant strategy to join the WTO in the first place: full 
integration with the world economy with the catalyzing effect 
thereof on its domestic reform process and the creation of the 
globally competitive firms that it so desperately desires.26 For 
both countries, the leavening presence of the rest of the APEC 
membership should help dilute and diffuse bilateral tensions 
and thus promote productive outcomes.
As noted already, the assumption of congressional control 
in  early  2007  by  a  Democratic  majority  greatly  increases 
the stakes of the rest of the world in US policy toward the 
FTAAP (and all other trade issues). The economic partners 
of the United States, especially those that depend as heavily 
on trade as virtually all of the Asians do, have a major inter-
est in avoiding an antiglobalization or protectionist turn in 
American policy. Hence they should eagerly cooperate with 
the Bush administration in forging initiatives, like the FTAAP, 
that will provide a compelling case for the extension of TPA in 
mid-2007. They should also seek to engage the United States 
in international negotiations that would be difficult, if not 
impossible, for a new president in 2009 to repudiate even if 
she or he wanted to do so. 
Indeed, the other member economies of APEC should 
make every effort to push the United States in the FTAAP 
direction under these conditions. Despite the short-sighted 
preferences  of  some  Asians  to  be  left  alone  by  the  United 
26. A technical but very important question is the differing concept of “FTAs” 
maintained by the United States and other APEC members such as Australia, 
Canada, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore on the one hand and by China 
and some other Asians on the other. The former group insists on “high qual-
ity” FTAs, though they sometimes falter in practice as when sugar was totally 
excluded from the US-Australia agreement, whereas the latter define “free 
trade” more loosely and seem to place overriding emphasis on political consid-
erations. These differences would have to be addressed in seriously considering 
an FTAAP. So would some of the US deviations from its own high-standard 
principles such as the “yarn forward” concept that dominates the rules of 
origin for textile/apparel trade in US FTAs and would represent a hurdle to 
rolling existing US agreements into a single FTAAP.
States, including to proceed with their own regional PTAs, it 
is they who would be hurt most by a United States that was 
backsliding into protectionism and becoming unable to nego-
tiate internationally. They should thus be deeply concerned by 
a lapse of TPA or the advent of a new administration that was 
disinclined to undertake new liberalization initiatives and do 
everything they can to help the current administration resist 
such developments.
ConClusion
The FTAAP initiative that APEC has already undertaken may 
well turn out to be the best, or perhaps only, way to
•	 catalyze a substantively successful Doha Round;
•	 offer an alternative Plan B to restore the momentum of 
trade liberalization if Doha fails or continues to falter 
badly;
•	 prevent  a  further,  possibly  explosive,  proliferation  of 
bilateral and subregional PTAs, which create substantial 
new discrimination and discord within the Asia-Pacific 
region;
•	 avoid renewed risk of “drawing a line down the middle 
of the Pacific” as East Asian, and perhaps Western Hemi-
sphere,  initiatives  produce  disintegration  of  the  Asia 
Pacific  rather  than  broader  regional  integration  APEC 
was created to foster;
•	 channel the China–United States economic conflict into 
a  more  constructive  and  less  confrontational  context, 
which could defuse at least some of its attendant tension 
and risks; 
•	 revitalize APEC itself, which is now of enhanced impor-
tance because of the prospects for Asia Pacific and espe-
cially  China–United  States  fissures;  and,  perhaps  most 
important in the short and even medium run,
•	 maintain US engagement in Asian, and even global, trade 
relations by providing a basis for congressional extension 
of TPA in mid-2007 and a negotiating momentum that 
the next US president in early 2009 will feel compelled to 
honor.
Prior to the initial APEC summits, in Seattle in 1993 
and Bogor in 1994, very few observers believed it would be 
possible or even conceivable for the APEC leaders to endorse 
the concept of “free and open trade and investment in the 
region” by the dates certain of 2010 and 2020. Many member 
economies were particularly skeptical of the willingness and 
ability of the United States to take part in such an initia-
tive, let alone lead it. The leaders did adopt the Bogor goals, 
however, and the United States played a central role in that 
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process. They did so for many of the same reasons that seem 
so compellingly in favor of resuscitating the Bogor strategy via 
an FTAAP today.
The APEC leaders and ministers have now taken the first 
steps in this process by conducting initial discussions of the 
idea, formally deciding to give it “serious consideration” and 
directing their officials to think through how it might work 
in practice. The next step is for APEC’s senior officials, and 
perhaps the region’s trade ministers at their annual meeting in 
July 2007, to begin serious consultations on an FTAAP even 
while the studies are under way. Serious consultations could 
lay a foundation for the leaders of at least some of the member 
economies  to  launch  full-scale  negotiations  at  this  year’s 
summit in Sydney and to start mobilizing domestic support 
for the idea. The FTAAP can and should become the next 
major step in the evolution of both the global trading system 
and the architecture of the Asia-Pacific region.
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